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11 Introduction
In this paper we determine the optimal combination of taxes on money,
consumption and income in transactions technology models where exogenous
government expenditures must be ﬁnanced with distortionary taxes. We
show that the optimal policy does not tax money, regardless of whether the
government can use an income tax, a consumption tax, or the two taxes
jointly, as alternative ﬁscal instruments to the tax on money. This result
contradicts the claims raised in the optimal inﬂation tax literature, that the
conditions for the optimality of a zero tax on money depend on the choice of
the alternative tax instrument. We argue that the reason for this divergence
is an inappropriate speciﬁcation of the transactions technology adopted in
the literature.
The debate on the optimal tax on money dates back to Friedman (1969)
and to his policy rule of a zero nominal interest rate. This rule was justi-
ﬁed with the ﬁrst best argument that the price charged for the use of real
balances should be set equal to the production cost, which is approximately
zero. Phelps (1973) challenged the relevance of Friedman’s (1969) result by
arguing that, in a second best world where government expenditures must
be ﬁnanced with distortionary taxes, liquidity should be taxed as any other
good. Recent literature has revised the argument of Phelps (1973). In par-
ticular, Kimbrough (1986) criticizes Phelps’s (1973) conclusion on the basis
that liquidity should not be modelled as a ﬁnal good but rather as an inter-
mediate good in the production of transactions. Kimbrough (1986) assumes
a transactions technology where transactions time is a function of consump-
tion expenditures gross of taxes and real money holdings. For a technology
that is homogeneous of degree one, Kimbrough (1986) shows that the Fried-
man rule is optimal in a second best environment. This result appears to be
consistent with Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) optimal taxation rules of inter-
mediate goods. According to these rules, if the technology is constant returns
to scale and if taxes on ﬁnal consumption goods are available, intermediate
goods should not be taxed.
Correia and Teles (1996) generalize the optimality of the Friedman rule to
homogeneous transactions technologies of any degree and provide a diﬀerent
explanation for the result. The optimality of the Friedman rule is a general
result because money is costless to produce. If money were modelled as a
costly intermediate good, the optimal tax on money would be zero only if the
transactions technology were homogeneous of degree one. For homogeneous
technologies of other degrees, such as the one considered by Baumol (1952)
and Tobin (1956), the tax would be diﬀerent from zero. However, as the cost
of producing money is assumed to be arbitrarily close to zero, even if the
2optimal ad valorem tax or subsidy is bounded away from zero, the optimal
price charged for the use of money also approaches zero.
Correia and Teles (1996) solve the optimal inﬂation tax problem by com-
paring the inﬂation tax to an income tax. The policy exercise performed by
Kimbrough (1986), instead, was to compare the inﬂation tax to a consump-
tion tax. This is an important distinction because, while income taxes do not
aﬀect monetary transactions directly, consumption taxes need to be paid by
the households each time a consumption good is purchased. When consump-
tion taxes are considered, the issue arises of how exactly these taxes aﬀect
households’ transactions. Kimbrough (1986) proposes a speciﬁcation for the
transactions technology in which money is not unit elastic with respect to
the price level gross of consumption taxes. This transactions technology was
later adopted by Végh (1989), Dixit (1991), Guidotti and Végh (1993), and
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997). Guidotti and Végh (1993) and Mulli-
gan and Sala-i-Martin (1997) show that, when the alternative to inﬂation
is a consumption tax, the optimality of the Friedman rule does not gener-
alize to homogeneous transactions technologies of any degree. Additional
restrictions, that Kimbrough (1986) assumes, are necessary. According to
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997), these restrictions turn the optimality of
t h eF r i e d m a nr u l ei n t oaf r a g i l er e s u l t .
Under the speciﬁcation of the transactions technology proposed by Kim-
brough (1986), since the optimal allocations may depend on the choice of
the alternative tax instrument to the inﬂation tax, income and consumption
taxes are not equivalent ﬁscal instruments. When two taxes are not equiv-
alent and there is no reason to exclude one of them, they should be jointly
considered. We allow for both income and consumption taxes as alternatives
to the inﬂation tax, and ﬁnd that the Friedman rule is again optimal for all
homogenous transactions technologies. However, we obtain the disturbing
result that, under certain conditions, the optimal policy mix requires to fully
tax income and subsidize consumption. The conditions under which this ex-
treme policy mix is optimal are also conditions under which the Friedman
rule is not optimal when only consumption taxes are considered.
These results arise because, under Kimbrough’s (1986) speciﬁcation of
the transactions technology, money is not always unit elastic with respect to
the price level gross of consumption taxes. When the technology is homoge-
neous of degree greater than zero, the elasticity is higher than one. We show
that, in this case, there may be an incentive for the government to reduce
consumption taxes, in order to reduce the volume and costs of households’
transactions. If both consumption and income taxes are available, it may be
optimal to fully tax income and subsidize consumption. Under this policy,
gross consumption expenditures are zero, and the resources used for trans-
3actions are minimized. The government performs all transactions on behalf
of the households, at zero cost.
We argue that the transactions technology should be restricted to ensure
a unitary elasticity. In the absence of consumption taxes, a natural property
of the transactions technology is that money be unit elastic with respect to
the price of the consumption goods, because only real money matters for the
provision of liquidity services. In an environment with consumption taxes,
money should be unit elastic with respect to the price level gross of consump-
tion taxes, because both the goods and the consumption taxes on those goods
need to be paid with money. If the price level gross of consumption taxes is
increased and money is increased in the same proportion, transactions should
not be aﬀected.
We propose a speciﬁcation of the transactions technology such that money
is always unit elastic with respect to the price level gross of consumption
taxes. Under this technology, the Friedman rule is optimal when the alter-
native tax instruments are an income tax, a consumption tax or both taxes.
Consumption and income taxes are equivalent ﬁscal instruments.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we describe the model under
the standard speciﬁcation of the transactions technology used in the liter-
ature, and under a speciﬁcation where money is unit elastic with respect
to the price level gross of consumption taxes. In Section 3, we consider the
standard transactions technology and compute the optimal mix of inﬂation,
consumption and income taxes. We show that the Friedman rule is optimal
for all homogenous technologies. However, under certain conditions, we ﬁnd
that the optimal policy mix requires full taxation of income and subsidization
of consumption. We relate the conditions under which this prescription is
obtained to the conditions under which the Friedman rule fails to be optimal,
w h e no n l yc o n s u m p t i o nt a x e sc a nb eu s e da sa na l t e r n a t i v et oi n ﬂation. In
Section 4, we propose a speciﬁcation of the transactions technology, where
money is always unit elastic with respect to the price level gross of taxes. We
show that, under this speciﬁcation, consumption and income taxes are equiv-
alent ﬁscal instruments. The Friedman rule is optimal for all homogenous
transactions technologies. In Section 5,w ei n t e r p r e tt h er e s u l t sb yr e l a t i n g
them to the optimal taxations rules of costly intermediate goods. Section 6
contains the conclusions.
2 The Transactions Technology Model
We consider a monetary model with a transactions technology, as in Kim-
brough (1986), Guidotti and Végh (1993), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe
4(1996), Correia and Teles (1996, 1999) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997).1
We allow for two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the transactions technology, the
standard formulation as in Kimbrough (1986), and an alternative formula-
tion that exhibits unitary elasticity of money with respect to the price level
gross of consumption taxes.
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households
and by a government that must ﬁnance an exogenous sequence of public
expenditures {gt} with inﬂation, consumption and income taxes.





where ct and ht denote the amount of consumption and leisure enjoyed at
time t. The instantaneous utility U i sa s s u m e dt ob ea ni n c r e a s i n ga n d
concave function.
Each household is endowed with one unit of time that can be allocated to
labor, nt, leisure, ht, or transactions, st. Labor is used to produce one good
that can be used for private or public consumption, ct+gt = yt, according to
the linear technology, yt = nt.I ne a c hp e r i o dt, the households choose money
holdings, Mt, to be used for transactions in that same period, and nominal
bond holdings, Bt. These bonds entitle the households to (1 + it)Bt units
of money in period t +1 . it is the net nominal interest rate. We denote the
consumption tax and the income tax by θt and τt respectively. The budget
constraints for t ≥ 0 are given by conditions
M0 + B0 ≤ W0, (2)
Pt(1+θt)ct+Mt+1+Bt+1 ≤ Pt (1 − τt)(1− ht − st)+Mt+(1+it)Bt,t ≥ 0,
(3)
together with a no-Ponzi games condition. Pt is the price of the consumption
good in units of money, before taxes. For simplicity, throughout the paper
we assume that W0 =0 .
The households need to use transactions time and money in order to
acquire the consumption good, according to a transactions technology. We
consider two speciﬁcations of this technology.
The standard speciﬁcation of the transactions technology, ﬁrst proposed
by Kimbrough (1986) and then widely used in the literature, is represented
1The set up is a slight variation of the model in Kimbrough (1986), Guidotti and Végh
(1993) and Correia and Teles (1996) in that the timing of the transactions is diﬀerent.









with θt ≥− 1.L e tmt ≡ Mt
Pt(1+θt). We can then state the following assump-
tions on the transactions function l, in line with previous literature:
A1. The function l is homogeneous of degree k ≥ 0.
A2. The function l is such that lc (ct,m t) ≥ 0,l m (ct,m t) ≤ 0,l mm(ct,m t) ≥
0.
From homogeneity, the transactions technology (4) can also be written as
st =( 1+θt)kl(ct,m t)=[ ( 1+θt)ct]
k l(1, mt
ct ). This allows us to characterize
the point of full liquidity, m




c )=0 .S i n c elm(c,m)=ck−1lm
c (1, m
c ), at full liquidity lm(c,m)=0 .
At that point, an additional unit of real balances does not reduce transactions
time, for any θt, so that the households are satiated with liquidity. Notice
t h a ts a t i a t i o ni nr e a lb a l a n c e sc a na l s ob ea c h i e v e di ft h eg o v e r n m e n tc a n
fully subsidize consumption and set θt = −1.
The condition on the minimum degree of homogeneity of the transactions
technology, k ≥ 0, has to be imposed because otherwise lc (ct,m t) could be
negative at full liquidity, for a subset of the class of homogeneous transactions
technologies.2 It may be necessary to impose further restrictions on the
minimum value of the degree of homogeneity of the transactions technology,
k, depending on the curvature of the utility function, in order to ensure that
the private problem is concave.
According to the standard speciﬁcation of the transactions function, as
described by (4), the households purchase (1+θt)ct units of goods using time,
st, and real money before taxes, Mt
Pt . This transactions technology can be
interpreted as if the consumption tax was paid in units of consumption goods,
which in turn need to be purchased with money. Of the real goods that are
purchased, (1+θt)ct, the households keep ct, giving the rest to the government
when the tax is positive. When the tax is negative, the households only
need to use money and time to purchase a part of the goods, receiving the
rest as a real subsidy from the government. Under this speciﬁcation, by
subsidizing consumption the government is performing transactions on behalf
of the households.
2To see this, notice that from the homogeneity assumption, kl = clc + mlm. At full
liquidity, lm =0 . It follows that, when l is strictly positive at full liquidity, k must be non
negative for lc n o tt ob en e g a t i v ea tt h a tp o i n t .
6From homogeneity, the function (4) can also be written as








When k =0 , Mt is unit elastic with respect to Pt (1 + θt), so that when
the tax is increased, and Mt is increased in the same proportion, transactions
are not aﬀected. It is possible to keep constant transactions time, st,a n d
the real quantity of goods that the household takes home, ct.W h e nk>0,
this is no longer the case. If the tax were to be increased, money would have
to increase more than proportionately, in order to keep st and ct constant.
Alternatively, we can consider a reduction of the consumption tax θt,a n d
thus of the price level gross of taxes, Pt (1 + θt), together with a reduction
of Mt in the same proportion. If consumption were kept constant, time used
for transactions would be reduced. In particular, by setting θt = −1 time
used for transactions can be made equal to zero. In this case, the amount
of real money necessary to achieve the desired level of consumption can also
be zero. The households are still able to consume ct, because they receive it
from the government as a full subsidy.
We propose an alternative speciﬁcation of the transactions technology,
where money, Mt, is unit elastic with respect to the price level gross of








The function l satisﬁes the same two assumptions stated above. According to
(6), the households purchase ct units of goods using time, st, and real money
after taxes, Mt
Pt(1+θt).T h i si st h en a t u r a ls p e c i ﬁcation when the consumption
tax is paid in units of money. It turns out to be a convenient formulation
to analyze other Ramsey problems in monetary models with transactions
technologies, such as in Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2001).
When k =0 , it does not matter whether taxes are paid in units of goods
or of money. Money is unit elastic with respect to the price level gross of
consumption taxes and the speciﬁcations (4) and (6) are equivalent.
3 The Optimal Policy Mix under the Stan-
dard Transactions Technology
In this section, we solve the Ramsey problem using the speciﬁcation of the
transactions technology proposed by Kimbrough (1986) and used by Guidotti
7and Végh (1993) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997), among others. In
that literature the conditions for the optimality of the Friedman rule depend
on whether the alternative tax instrument is the consumption or the income
tax. The two taxes are, thus, not equivalent instruments, and therefore they
should be jointly considered.
In what follows, we show that once the government is allowed to use
both taxes, the Friedman rule is optimal for all homogeneous transactions
technologies, as in the case when the only alternative to the inﬂation tax is an
income tax. However, under certain additional conditions on the transactions
technology, the unique Ramsey solution requires the government to tax away
all income and give the revenue back to the households as a consumption
subsidy. Under those conditions, if the income tax is restricted to be zero,
the Friedman rule is not optimal. The lack of equivalence of the consumption
and the income taxes, the extreme policy prescription for the two taxes, and
the non-optimality of the Friedman rule when only the consumption tax is
considered are explained by the assumption that the transactions technology
does not exhibit a unitary elasticity of money with respect to the price level
gross of consumption taxes.
We consider an economy where transactions are performed according to
the standard transactions costs technology, (4). The budget constraints of
the household for t ≥ 0 are (2) and (3), where st is given by (4).
The maximization problem of the households implies the following mar-
ginal conditions:
Uc (t) − Uh(t)(1+θt)





















Condition (7) sets the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure, adjusted for the need to use time for transactions, equal to the
relative price. Condition (8) equates the marginal gain of using real money
to its marginal cost. Condition (9) is an intertemporal marginal condition.
Let Qt = 1
(1+i0)...(1+it) . The intertemporal budget constraint for the






















The resources constraints are given by
ct + gt ≤ 1 − ht − (1 + θt)
k l(ct,m t), t ≥ 0. (11)
In order to minimize the excess burden of taxation, the government solves
a Ramsey problem. This amounts to choosing, within the set of competitive
equilibria determined by conditions (7)-(11), the path for the quantities,
prices and taxes that maximizes welfare.
3.1 The Ramsey Solution
When the government has access to taxes on money, consumption and in-
come, the restrictions of the Ramsey problem are the resources constraints,
(11), the condition θt ≥− 1, and an implementability constraint. This latter







into the budget constraint (10).
In order to build the implementability constraint, we use the ﬁrst order





























Equations (7)-(8) can then be used to substitute it and τt into (12).
Notice that one of the three taxes cannot be substituted in the constraints
of the Ramsey problem, since conditions (7)-(8) can only determine two
unknowns. For convenience, we choose not to substitute θt.U s i n gt h ef a c t
that the function l(ct,m t) is homogeneous of degree k to write kl(ct,m t)=












The Ramsey problem consists of the choice of the path of quantities and of
the tax on consumption, {ct, ht, mt, θt}
∞
t=0 , that maximizes welfare, subject
to the restrictions (11), (13), and θt ≥− 1.
9Let β
tλt and ψ be the multipliers of the resources constraints, (11), and
the implementability condition, (13). Since they measure, respectively, the
excess burden of taxation and the shadow price of resources, they must be
positive at the optimum. The relevant ﬁrst order conditions of the Ramsey
problem are those for real balances and the consumption tax. They are given
respectively by
−[ψUh (t)(k − 1) + λt](1+θt)
k lm (ct,m t)=0 (14)
−[ψUh (t)(k − 1) + λt]kl(ct,m t)(1+θt)
k−1 ≤ 0. (15)
The following two propositions state the main results of this section.
Proposition 1 Let the government ﬁnance expenditures through an income
tax, a consumption tax or an inﬂation tax, and let the transactions technology
take the form in (4). Then the Friedman rule, it =0 , for all t, is optimal for
all homogeneous transactions technologies.
Proof. A ss h o w ni nt h eA p p e n d i x ,t h et e r mi ns q u a r eb r a c k e t si nc o n d i -
tion (14) is strictly positive. The optimal solution is thus characterized by
(1 + θt)
k lm (ct,m t)=0 . From (7) and (8), it must be that it =0 .
The Proposition states that the Friedman rule is always optimal for homo-
geneous transactions technologies, as when the only alternative to inﬂation
is the income tax. If the optimal solution has θt > −1, then it must be that
lm (ct,m t)=0 , which deﬁnes the point of full liquidity, m
c .W h e nθt = −1,
t h e r ei sal a r g es e to fr a t i o sm
c that is consistent with the optimal solution.
This is not surprising because, with full subsidization of consumption, the
household is able to achieve satiation in real balances for any ratio m
c .T h e
transactions are carried out by the government so that the amount of real
balances held by the household is irrelevant. Increasing real balances does
not help in reducing transactions time.
Proposition 2 Let the government ﬁnance expenditures through an income
tax, a consumption tax or an inﬂation tax, and let the transactions technology
take the form in (4). Then, it is optimal to set θt = −1 and τt =1 . Whenever
k>0 and l(ct,m t) > 0, at full liquidity, then θt = −1 and τt =1is the
unique solution. Otherwise, a continuum of combinations of θt and τt are
solutions of the Ramsey problem.
Proof. From condition (15), it follows that, whenever k>0 and l(ct,m t) >
0 at full liquidity, it is optimal to increase the subsidy on consumption to
its maximum level, θt = −1. From the household’s optimality condition (7),
10θt = −1 requires that τt =1 . When the transactions function is homogeneous
of degree zero, or when l(ct,m t)=0 at full liquidity, the Ramsey condition
(15) is satisﬁed as an equality. Therefore, any combination of θt and τt that
satisﬁes (7) is a solution.
Once we allow for both consumption and income taxes, the result of
optimality of the Friedman rule for all homogeneous transactions technologies
is recovered. However, under certain conditions, the unique Ramsey solution
recommends full taxation of income and subsidization of consumption. Those
conditions are that the degree of homogeneity is strictly positive k>0,a n d











=0 , it is not possible to determine both the con-
sumption and the income tax. This means that the two taxes are equivalent
ﬁscal instruments. The interpretation of the conditions under which this
equivalence holds is straightforward, in light of the discussion of the prop-
erties of the transactions technologies in the previous section. When k =0 ,
the standard transactions technology has the property that money is unit
elastic with respect to the price level gross of consumption taxes. When the
elasticity is unitary it is not possible to save on resources by reducing the
consumption tax. The other condition for equivalence is that time at full
liquidity is zero. In this case, even if the elasticity is not unitary, it is not
possible to save on transactions time by reducing the consumption tax.
3.2 Restrictions on Tax Instruments
In this section, we review the results in the literature when only one alterna-
tive tax instrument is allowed for. We relate the conditions for equivalence
of the two tax instruments, shown above, to the conditions for the Friedman
rule to be optimal when only consumption taxes are considered.
When the tax on consumption is restricted to be zero, θt =0 ,t h ee c o n -
omy collapses to the one described in Correia and Teles (1996). In that case,
the ﬁrst order conditions of the private problem, equations (7)-(9), can de-






t=0. It follows that the two
restrictions of the Ramsey problem, the resources constraints (11) and the
implementability condition (13), are stated in terms of quantities only. The
ﬁrst order conditions of the Ramsey problem are the same, with θt =0 ,
except that condition (15) disappears. From (14), we have
[ψUh(t)(1− k) − λt]lm (ct,m t)=0 . (16)
The result obtained by Correia and Teles (1996) follows immediately. The
11Friedman rule is optimal for any degree of homogeneity of the transactions
technology.
We consider now the case when the income tax is restricted to be zero,
τt =0 .T h eﬁrst order conditions of the private problem, equations (7)-(9),






t=0,i nt e r m s
of the quantities. Here, however, it is not possible to write θt,a n dt h u sit,
explicitly as a function of the quantities. Using condition (7), we express θt
implicitly by the function θ(t) ≡ θ(ct,h t,m t).
The restrictions of the Ramsey problem are given by (11), (13) and the
restriction that θt = θ(t), which is deﬁned implicitly by (7). The government
has to choose the path {ct,h t,m t}
∞
t=0 that maximizes (1), subject to (11) and
(13) , where θt = θ(t).
The marginal condition of the Ramsey problem with respect to mt is
given by
−[ψUh(t)(k − 1) + λt]
n
(1 + θt)








k lcm (ct,m t)
1+k (1 + θt)
k−1 lc (ct,m t)
, (18)
which is obtained from the implicit function θ(t).
Notice that, from st =( 1+θ(t))
k l(ct,m t), the term in curly brackets in
(17) is ∂st
∂mt, i.e. the total marginal eﬀect of changing mt o nt h et i m eu s e d
for transactions, keeping consumption and leisure constant. The ﬁrst term is
the direct eﬀect on transactions time and thus on resources, while the second
term is the indirect eﬀect through the change in the consumption tax. When
this second term is zero, this means that it is not possible to reduce time
used for transactions by aﬀecting the consumption tax. Then the optimal
solution requires it =0 , for all t. In fact, as the term in square brackets is
strictly positive, lm (ct,m t)=0i st h es o l u t i o no f( 1 7 ) .
The indirect eﬀect will be zero, at the point of full liquidity, when either
kl(ct,m t) or lcm(ct,m t) is zero. kl(ct,m t)=0 , at full liquidity, is the condi-
tion derived in section 3.1 for consumption and income taxes to be equivalent.
Since the Friedman rule is optimal for all homogeneous technologies when
only income taxes are considered, if kl(ct,m t)=0t h eF r i e d m a nr u l em u s t
also be optimal for all homogeneous technologies when only consumption
taxes are considered.
Even if consumption and income taxes are not equivalent instruments and
the optimal solution is to fully subsidize consumption and to fully tax income
when both taxes are available, it can still be the case that the Friedman rule
12is optimal when only consumption taxes are used. That is the case when
lcm(ct,m t)=0 , at full liquidity.3 From (18), it follows that in this case it
is not possible to aﬀect the consumption tax by marginally changing real
money.
Kimbrough (1986) analyzes essentially the same model with the consump-
tion tax as the only alternative tax instrument. In his model, it is assumed
that the transactions technology is homogeneous of degree one and that time
for transactions l(t) is zero at full liquidity, so that the Friedman rule is op-
timal. In Guidotti and Végh (1993) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997),
time spent transacting at full liquidity can take a positive value and the
transactions technology is homogeneous of any degree. In those models, the
Friedman rule is optimal if it is assumed that l(1+θ)c ((1 + θ)c,(1 + θ)m)=0
at full liquidity. This assumption is equivalent to k (1 + θt)
k l(ct,m t)=0
at full liquidity.4 Condition (17) shows that the Friedman rule may still
be optimal when k(1 + θt)
k l(ct,m t) 6=0 , provided that lcm(t)=0at full
liquidity. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997) rule out this case by assuming
that lcm (t) < 0.5
4 The Optimal Policy Mix with a Unit Elas-
tic Transactions Technology
In this section, we compute the Ramsey solution when the transactions tech-
nology is described by the alternative speciﬁcation (6), which exhibits unit
elasticity of money with respect to the price level gross of consumption taxes.
We show that the consumption and income taxes are equivalent and the con-
ditions for the optimality of the Friedman rule are independent of the choice
of the alternative tax instrument.
The private problem is deﬁned by the maximization of (1), subject to
(2), (3) and (6). As before, we assume that W0 =0 . At the optimum, the
following marginal conditions must be satisﬁed:






3That would be the case, for instance, with the transactions technology l(ct,m t)= ³




4In fact, using Euler’s theorem we have k(1 + θt)
k l(ct,m t)=
kl((1 + θt)ct,(1 + θt)mt)=l(1+θt)ct (t)(1+θt)ct + l(1+θt)mt (t)(1+θt)mt. Since,
at full liquidity, l(1+θt)mt (t)(1+θt)mt =0 , the two assumptions are equivalent.
5This excludes the Baumol-Tobin transactions function, whose speciﬁcation is such
































(1 − τt)(1−ht−l(ct,m t)),
(22)
The resources constraints are given by
ct + gt ≤ 1 − ht − l(ct,m t), t ≥ 0. (23)
Conditions (19)-(23) deﬁne the set of feasible and implementable alloca-
tions, {ct, ht, mt}
∞






t=0.I no r d e r
to construct a single implementability condition, we use the ﬁrst order con-




















itmt − (1 − ht − l(ct,m t))
#
=0 . (24)
Using conditions (19), (20) to substitute for 1+θt
1−τt and it into the intertemporal
budget constraint (24), and using the fact that l(t) is homogeneous of degree




t {Uc(t)ct − Uh(t)[(1− ht) − (1 − k)l(ct,m t)]} =0 . (25)
Notice that it is not possible to determine both the consumption tax, θt,
and the income tax, τt.O n l yt h er a t i o1+θt
1−τt can be determined. This means
that the two taxes are equivalent ﬁscal instruments.
T h eR a m s e yp r o b l e mi st h ec h o i c eo f{ct, ht, mt}
∞
t=0 that maximizes wel-
fare in the set that satisﬁes conditions (23) and (25). Let β
tλt and ψ be the
new multipliers of the resources conditions, (23), and of the implementabil-
ity condition, (25). The marginal condition of the Ramsey problem for mt is
given by
−[ψUh(t)(k − 1) + λt]lm (ct,m t)=0 . (26)
We can now state the following proposition.
14Proposition 3 Let the government ﬁnance expenditures through an income
tax, a consumption tax or an inﬂation tax, and let the transactions technology
take the form in (6). The Ramsey solution is decentralized by it =0 ,f o ra l l
t, and by any combination of θt and τt that satisﬁes condition (19). The
Friedman rule it =0 , for all t, also decentralizes the optimal solution when
the alternative instrument to the inﬂation tax is either an income tax or a
consumption tax.
Proof. The restrictions of the Ramsey problem, i.e., the implementability
and feasibility conditions, are the same, whether the alternative tax instru-
ment is a consumption tax, an income tax, or both. It can be shown, as done
in the Appendix for the model under the standard transactions technology,
that the term in square brackets in (26) is strictly positive. Then, from (26),
an interior solution must satisfy lm (t)=0 . This can be decentralized by
it =0 ,f o ra l lt. When both consumption and income taxes are available,
the optimal allocation is decentralized by any combination of θt and τt that
satisﬁes condition (19).
The Friedman rule is optimal for any homogenous transactions technolo-
gies. The assumption of homogeneity is justiﬁed by both theoretical and
empirical work. In Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), Barro (1976), Guidotti
(1989) and Jovanovic (1982), the transactions technologies are homogeneous
of degree zero. Marshall (1992) proposes and estimates a transactions tech-
nology that is homogeneous of degree one and Braun (1994) estimates the
degree of homogeneity to be .98. Homogeneous functions have the property
that the scale elasticity of the money demand is one,6 at full liquidity. In-
deed, at full liquidity lm
c (1, m
c )=0 ,s ot h a tm = υc,w h e r eυ is a constant.
While there is empirical evidence, often contradictory, on the scale elasticity,
there is virtually no evidence on the elasticity at full liquidity. The closest
evidence is the result in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996), which suggests
that the scale elasticity of the household demand for money approaches one
for interest rates that are close to zero.7
5 Why is the Friedman Rule Optimal?
In this section we interpret the results obtained above on the optimality of the
Friedman rule. We show that the Friedman rule is generally optimal because
6The scale elasticity is deﬁned as the elasticity of money demand with respect to con-




7Using a calibrated model with US data on the money demand, Correia and Teles
(1999) show that, if the transactions technology is not homogeneous, the optimal inﬂation
tax remains very close to the Friedman rule.
15money is costless to produce. Furthermore, we show that Kimbrough’s (1986)
intuition, that money should not be taxed because it is an intermediate good,
is not correct under his speciﬁcation of the transactions technology.
We follow the strategy used by Correia and Teles (1996, 1999) and slightly
modify the economies by modelling money as a good that is costly to produce.
We solve the corresponding Ramsey problems for a government that can use
a tax on consumption as the alternative instrument to the tax on money. The
Ramsey solution can thus be related to the optimal taxation rules for costly
intermediate goods derived by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). According to
these rules, if the technology is constant returns to scale and consumption
taxes are available, it is not optimal to tax intermediate goods.
We start by considering the model with a unit elastic transactions tech-
nology, as in (6). In this economy money requires labor to be produced,
according to the technology n2,t = αmt. The households supply labor for the
production of the consumption good in the amount of n1,t =1−ht−st−n2,t
units of time. The only modiﬁcation in the Ramsey problem solved in Sec-
tion 4 is that the resources constraint will have to include the real resources
used in the supply of real money,
ct + gt ≤ 1 − ht − l(ct,m t) − αmt, t ≥ 0. (27)
The problem of the planner is thus to choose the path {ct,h t,m t}
∞
t=0
that maximizes (1), subject to the implementability condition, (25), and the
resources constraints, (27). The marginal condition of the Ramsey problem
with respect to real balances is given by
−[ψUh (k − 1) + λt]lm (ct,m t) − αλt =0 , (28)
which collapses to the Ramsey ﬁrst-order condition (26) when money is cost-








In this environment, the ﬁr s tb e s ti sc h a r a c t e r i z e db y−lm (ct,m t)=α.
The marginal rate of technical substitution in the production of transactions,
−lm (ct,m t), has to be equal to the social cost, α.W h e nk is equal to one,
it is optimal not to distort production by setting a zero proportional tax on
money, in line with Diamond and Mirrlees’ (1971) taxation rules. Otherwise,
depending on whether k i sg r e a t e ro rl o w e rt h a n1,i ti so p t i m a lt os e te i t h e r
a subsidy or a tax, respectively, on the use of money in the production of
transactions. As α converges to zero, the proportional distortion,
ψUh(k−1)
λt ,
16does not approach zero, and so it is still optimal to set a non zero proportional
tax. However, from (20), the optimal price to be charged for the use of money,
it, is zero. It is the costless nature of money that explains the robustness of
the optimality of the Friedman rule.
Under the standard transactions technology, (4), it is generally optimal
to tax money even when the technology is constant returns to scale. In this
case, the optimal taxation rules of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) do not apply.
Again we modify the Ramsey problem in Section 3 in order to incorporate a
cost of producing real money. The resources constraints are
ct + gt ≤ 1 − ht − (1 + θt)
k l(ct,m t) − αmt, t ≥ 0. (30)
We consider the case when the income tax is restricted to be zero. The
restrictions of the Ramsey problem are (30), (13) and the restriction that θt =
θ(t), which is deﬁned implicitly by (7). The planner’s marginal condition for
real balances is
−[ψUh(t)(k − 1) + λt]
n
(1 + θt)





When k =1 , this becomes
−(1 + θt)lm (ct,m t)=α + l(ct,m t)θm(t) (32)
The ﬁrst best is characterized by −(1 + θt)lm (ct,m t)=α.A s l o n g a s
l(ct,m t)θm(t) 6=0at that point, it is optimal to distort production and to
tax or subsidize money when there are constant returns to scale in production.
When α → 0, the ﬁrst best coincides with the point of full liquidity. At that
point, it is reasonable to assume that l(ct,m t)θm(t)=0 , as Kimbrough
(1986) does.8 Hence, when α → 0, the Friedman rule may be optimal.
When α > 0,t h eﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o ni sn o ta tf u l ll i q u i d i t ya n di ti sn o t
reasonable to assume that l(ct,m t)θm(t)=0at that point. Thus, if money
were costly, and k =1 , the optimal tax on money would be diﬀerent from
zero. This is inconsistent with Diamond and Mirrlees (1986) optimal taxation
rules of intermediate goods. Thus Kimbrough’s (1986) interpretation of the
optimality of a zero tax on money, based on money being an intermediate
good, is not the appropriate one. Kimbrough’s (1986) result is due to the
assumption that money is costless.
The reason why the Diamond and Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation rules
fail to apply under Kimbrough’s (1986) speciﬁcation of the transactions tech-
nology is the odd structure of the economy, where the consumption tax af-
fects the technology used to produce the consumption good. According to
8Kimbrough (1986) assumes that transactions time at full liquidity is zero.
17this production structure, the consumption good, c, is produced using time,
n1, and transactions in ﬁxed coeﬃcients. Transactions are performed ac-
cording to the function f( s
(1+θ)
k,m), which is obtained from the transactions
function s =( 1+θ)
k l(c,m). The Leontief technology is thus described by





. Now consider a reduction in the consumption
tax, θ. For a given amount of labor supplied, n1, it is possible to produce the
same amount of the consumption good, c, using less time, s, while keeping
constant money, m, and the time devoted to the production of money, n2.
Thus, a reduction in the consumption tax allows to save on resources that
can be used for consumption or leisure. When the choice of the government
i sb e t w e e nat a xo nm o n e ya n dat a xo nc o n s u m p t i o n ,i ti so p t i m a lt os e ta
positive tax on money in order to lower the consumption tax and to save on
the resources used for transactions.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we derive the optimal inﬂation tax in a monetary model where
money and time are necessary for transactions. We show that the Friedman
rule is the optimal solution when the ﬁscal choice is between an income tax
a n da ni n ﬂation tax, a consumption tax and an inﬂation tax or all three tax
instruments. In doing so, we object to recent claims in the literature that the
optimality of the Friedman rule is a fragile result because it crucially hinges
upon the ﬁscal instrument used by the government as an alternative to the
inﬂation tax.
We show that the claimed fragility is due to the speciﬁcation of the trans-
actions technology traditionally used in the literature, when consumption
taxes are considered. In particular, the elasticity of money with respect to
the price level gross of taxes has been assumed to be non-unitary. We ar-
gue that a unitary elasticity is the appropriate assumption. In that case,
the Friedman rule is optimal for all homogeneous transactions technologies,
irrespective of the choice of the alternative tax instrument.
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AP r o p o s i t i o n 1
Here we show that, at the optimum,
[ψUh (t)(k − 1) + λt] > 0. (33)
When k ≥ 1, the term is strictly positive, because the multipliers are strictly
positive. When k ∈ [0,1), we use an argument similar to the one used in
Correia and Teles (1996), to ensure that the term is still strictly positive.




Uch (t)ct + Uh (t) − Uhh(t)
h





Suppose that, for some k ∈ [0,1), [ψUh(t)(k − 1) + λt]=0 .T h e n ,w ec a n
use this to substitute λt in (34). Since the problem is stationary, manipulating
the implementability condition we obtain
D(t)ct =
h






Uh(t) is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure. Using this expression and rearranging terms, we can reformulate
condition (34) as
Uh(t)+ψ [Uh (t)Dh (t)ct + kUh(t)] = 0.
20As shown in De Fiore (2000), if consumption is a non inferior good, Dh(t) ≥
0. Therefore, the term on the LHS of this expression is strictly positive
since Uh (t) > 0, and the equation cannot be satisﬁed. This implies that
[ψUh(t)(k − 1) + λt]=0cannot be a solution to the Ramsey problem. We
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